Central Asia’s divergent approaches
to Russian economic statecraft
by Eleftherios Ladas
This article examines the prospects for Russian-led economic integration in Eurasia, particularly in the context of the 16th BRICS Summit in October 2024, focusing on the stances of the Central Asian republics. Almost two weeks before the summit, the Uzbek First Vice-Speaker of the Legislative Chamber, Akmal Saidov, stated that Tashkent intends to remain an observer in the Eurasian Economic Union, whereas Astana refrained from joining BRICS altogether. Coalition building is paramount for Moscow to consolidate its great power status, which has been seriously impaired since the dissolution of the USSR. However, its assertiveness over Ukraine has backfired, with Central Asian leaders hesitant to further deepen their relations with Moscow, fearing for their sovereignty. Furthermore, Beijing’s growing geopolitical reach is also undermining Moscow’s notion of primacy in Eurasia, since any attempt to establish multilateral institutions without Beijing’s involvement is essentially lacking legitimacy.
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Picture: ‘Казань. Билборд с рекламой саммита БРИКС в Казани, 2024 год’ by MarSaf under a CC BY-SA 4.0 License.
The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the author. They do not purport to reflect the opinions or views of the Institute of International Relations or its Researchers.